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NLNOG New Years Event / Nieuwjaarsborrel 2019
by Job Snijders 11 Dec '18

11 Dec '18

Beste NLNOGers, [ English TL;DR - The NLNOG New Years Event will be celebrated in the "Winkel van Sinkel" walking distance from train station Utrecht Centraal on January 18th, 2019! Come join us! ] Het is weer bijna zover! De immer legendarische NLNOG Nieuwjaarsborrel komt eraan. Een prima traditie om met vrienden en collega’s het nieuwe jaar in te luiden met een drankje en een bittergarnituur. Details: -------- Tijd: vanaf 19:00 Datum: 18 januari 2019 Plaats: Winkel van Sinkel, Utrecht https://www.dewinkelvansinkel.nl/ Aanmelden --------- Hoe meer zielen, hoe meer vreugd, dus neem ook eens een collega mee die nog nooit van NLNOG heeft gehoord ;-) Vergeet je niet even aan te melden via de eventbrite link! Registratie tool: https://nlnognewyear2019.eventbrite.nl Alvast hele fijne dagen, en we hopen jullie allemaal te zien op 18 januari! Met vriendelijke groeten, Job, Nathalie, Niels, Melchior, Thomas Stichting NLNOG

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Spoofer Report for NLNOG for Nov 2018
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Dec '18

08 Dec '18

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nld. Inferred improvements during Nov 2018: ASN Name Fixed-By 203201 IT-SUPERNAP 2018-11-26 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 44858 PROXSYS 2018-03-26 2018-11-01 28878 SIGNET 2018-06-27 2018-11-26 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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Fwd: RIPE NCC's RPKI Planned Downtime
by Nathalie Trenaman 22 Nov '18

22 Nov '18

Hi all, Considering the high number of RPKI implementations in NL, this might be FYI: > Begin doorgestuurd bericht: > > Van: Thiago da Cruz <tdacruz(a)ripe.net> > Onderwerp: [Sidrops] RIPE NCC's RPKI Planned Downtime > Datum: 22 november 2018 om 10:34:32 CET > Aan: sidrops(a)ietf.org > > Hi all, > > We’ll be running an upgrade on our infrastructure on Monday 26 November from 08:00 UTC. > The RSYNC and RRDP repositories will be accessible, but the up down protocol, the RPKI user interface on my.ripe.net <http://my.ripe.net/>, and REST API will be unavailable during the upgrade. > > We expect the upgrade to take no longer than a few hours. Apologies for any inconvenience this may cause. > > https://www.ripe.net/support/service-announcements/rpki-planned-downtime <https://www.ripe.net/support/service-announcements/rpki-planned-downtime> > > Kind regards, > Thiago da Cruz - RIPE NCC > _______________________________________________ > Sidrops mailing list > Sidrops(a)ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidrops

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Save the dates! NLNOG events in 2019
by Job Snijders 13 Nov '18

13 Nov '18

Dear all, The NLNOG Foundation has put together a fantastic set of events for 2019! Mark the following dates in your agendas: 18 Jan 2019 - NLNOG New Years Drink, Utrecht 21 Jun 2019 - NLNOG Expert Sessions & BBQ, Location TBD 6 Sep 2019 - NLNOG Day 2019, Amsterdam Kind regards, Job

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Spoofer Report for NLNOG for Oct 2018
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Nov '18

08 Nov '18

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nld. Inferred improvements during Oct 2018: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Oct 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 44858 PROXSYS 2018-03-26 2018-10-23 28878 SIGNET 2018-06-27 2018-10-12 57494 ADMAN 2018-10-07 2018-10-07 201290 BlackGATE 2018-10-16 2018-10-16 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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The NL portion of RPKI unreachable IP space (2018-11-03)
by nusenu 03 Nov '18

03 Nov '18

As previously requested [1] I'm sending you the list of ASNs that announce RPKI unreachable IP space. ASN prefixes /24s -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 AS49981 WORLDSTREAM - WorldStream B.V. 3 4 2 AS60781 LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. 3 3 3 AS49453 GLOBALLAYER - Global Layer B.V. 2 2 4 AS136175 SERVERHOSH-AS-AP Serverhosh 2 2 5 AS206376 INTELLECTICAINDIA 1 1 6 AS39855 MOD-EU - Mod Mission Critical LLC 1 1 7 AS43350 NFORCE - NForce Entertainment B.V. 1 1 8 AS60144 THREE-W-INFRA-AS - 3W Infra B.V. 1 1 9 AS64484 ASDMZHOST - JUPITER 25 LIMITED 1 1 You can get an interactive (and regularly updated) version of this list via the RPKI Observatory where you also get the complete list of affected prefixes for each ASN (so there should be no need to send it to this list anymore). https://nusenu.github.io/RPKI-Observatory/unreachable_nl-v4.html kind regards, nusenu [1] http://mailman.nlnog.net/pipermail/nlnog/2018-September/002783.html -- https://twitter.com/nusenu_ https://mastodon.social/@nusenu

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Spoofer Report for NLNOG for Sep 2018
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Oct '18

08 Oct '18

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nld. Inferred improvements during Sep 2018: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 203201 IT-SUPERNAP 2018-06-13 2018-09-30 28878 SIGNET 2018-06-27 2018-09-10 202954 RAPIDDOT 2018-09-02 2018-09-02 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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RPKI Lunch at RIPE77
by Melchior Aelmans 05 Oct '18

05 Oct '18

Hi NLNOG! For those of you who have deploying RPKI, those who still need to and those who are interested in the next steps there's a lunch organised during the RIPE77 meeting. Feel free to register here: https://nlnog-rpki-lunch.eventbrite.nl/ Cheers, Melchior

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The NL portion of RPKI unreachable IP space
by nusenu 26 Sep '18

26 Sep '18

Hi, the tables bellow show the number of /24 IP blocks per AS that are unreachable in an RPKI route origin validating environment (this list is filtered for NL ASNs). I'd encourage everyone to look into the ROAs of affected prefixes (or to ask the customer / IP holder responsible for it). You can use the RPKI validator https://rpki-validator.ripe.net/bgp-preview or https://bgp.he.net (prefix view) to find the specific affected prefixes. If the invalids are expected (i.e. to test ROV) - like Job's prefixes are I suppose - than you can ignore this email (and maybe drop me an email). some more context: https://medium.com/@nusenu/where-are-rpki-unreachable-networks-located-65c7… kind regards, nusenu +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+ | ASN | (announcing) AS Name | /24 netblocks | +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+ | AS51088 | A2B - A2B IP B.V. | 16 | | AS15562 | SNIJDERS - Job Snijders | 8 | | AS205333 | ARCADIZ-NL - Arcadiz Networks BV | 4 | | AS50245 | SERVEREL-AS - Serverel Inc. | 3 | | AS12506 | INSPIRING-NETWORKS-BV - Inspiring Networks BV | 3 | | AS60781 | LEASEWEB-NL-AMS-01 - LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. | 3 | | AS136175 | SERVERHOSH-AS-AP Serverhosh Internet Service | 2 | | AS49453 | GLOBALLAYER - Global Layer B.V. | 2 | | AS49981 | WORLDSTREAM - WorldStream B.V. | 2 | | AS64484 | ASDMZHOST - JUPITER 25 LIMITED | 2 | | AS56630 | MELBICOM-EU-AS - Melbikomas UAB | 1 | | AS43350 | NFORCE - NForce Entertainment B.V. | 1 | | AS206376 | INTELLECTICAINDIA - Intellectica Systems India Private Limited | 1 | +----------+----------------------------------------------------------------+---------------+ Unreachable /48 IPv6 blocks: +----------+-----------------------------+---------------+ | ASN | (announcing) AS Name | /48 netblocks | +----------+-----------------------------+---------------+ | AS202196 | BOOKING-BV - Booking.com BV | 3 | +----------+-----------------------------+---------------+ -- https://twitter.com/nusenu_

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RPKI & Nederland
by Job Snijders 19 Sep '18

19 Sep '18

Internationaal onderkennen mensen de rol van Nederland op het gebied van RPKI. :-) Citaat van cloudflare blog: """ Then there's the Dutch! In early September, the NLNOG technical meeting featured a non-trivial number of RPKI-related talks. It seems that local Dutch operators and software developers are taking RPKI seriously and it’s possible that The Netherlands may contain some of the more forward-thinking RPKI networks around. """ Cloudflare's plannen en details over de uitrol worden beschreven in deze twee artikelen: https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/ Groeten, Job

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