In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nld. Inferred improvements during Aug 2023: ASN Name Fixed-By 213268 2023-08-03 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2023: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 20847 PREVIDER 2018-04-17 2023-08-31 8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2023-08-28 207176 OPENFIBER 2020-06-12 2023-08-31 213268 2020-12-07 2023-08-31 28685 ASN-ROUTIT 2023-08-23 2023-08-30 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org
participants (1)
-
CAIDA Spoofer Project