In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nld. Inferred improvements during Jun 2023: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2023: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 20847 PREVIDER 2018-04-17 2023-06-28 1136 KPN 2019-09-04 2023-06-13 8587 Infracom 2019-10-28 2023-06-05 207176 OPENFIBER 2020-06-12 2023-06-29 213268 2020-12-07 2023-06-28 212411 2023-03-15 2023-06-29 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nld&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org